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THE MOVEMENT FROM VIGOROUS TO
MALICIOUS DEFENSE AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE
EVOLUTION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Leo S. Ward
I. INTRODUCTION
Most torts develop slowly, evolving through changing social
conditions and shifting political winds. This article presents mali-
cious defense as an example of a tort in the process of evolution
from insignificance to prominence in the legal community. Mali-
cious defense, although currently only the stuff of dicta and the
faint praise of frustrated plaintiff's attorneys, lurks at the edge of
the judicial consciousness. Consternation with dilatory tactics, pro-
cedural abuses and motion wars should overcome traditional judi-
cial resistance to change and force the final revolutionary moment
of official recognition.
Judicial recognition of the tort of malicious defense represents
the final stage in a long evolutionary process. The genesis of the
process arose out of the problematic legal right that a defendant
enjoys to a vigorous defense. This right embraces a fundamental
legal concept to which the current legal community is closely tied.
But, abuses of vigorous defense create a crisis in the legal commu-
nity. Some defense attorneys purposely delay litigation' and gener-
ate unnecessary expense to discourage lawsuits or to encourage set-
tlements.2 Some defense attorneys use dilatory tactics as a matter
of course3 and are obstinate as a matter of practice.4 Such wanton
and vexatious abuse of the judicial process forces a reassessment of
vigorous defense as a viable legal concept. The tort of malicious
defense presents a proposed solution to procedural abuses which
incorporates and balances vigorous defense while limiting "excess
advocacy."' 5 Malicious defense evolves from the natural progression
of the right of vigorous defense into modern circumstances. And,
its development poses a classic example of how legal theories over-
come powerful resistance and evolve into commonly accepted prin-
ciples of law.
1. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 771, 686 P.2d
1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 364 (1984).
2. Parker Rust Proof Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 23 F.2d 502, 506 (E.D. Mich. 1928).
3. First Nat'l Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712, 713 (8th Cir. 1973).
4. City Bank v. Rivera Davila, 438 F.2d 1367, 1371 (1st Cir. 1971).
5. Van Patten and Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A Proposal for the Tort of Mali-
cious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 936 (1984).
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II. A MODEL FOR TORT EVOLUTION
Progress in law, like progress in science or history, is quantifi-
able and inevitable. Legal principles evolve against a background
of social upheaval and circumstance. Thomas Kuhn, in his critique
of the history of science, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,6
transforms the Hegelian dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis into
a framework for scientific and political change that serves as a
model for the evolution of legal principles. Kuhn considers the par-
adigm, "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques and
so on shared by a given community,"7 as the fixed reference point
in the flux of history. The paradigm is the strong and well estab-
lished central principle that guides and motivates the present pro-
fessional community. In this legal analogy, the paradigm is the
right of vigorous defense, the right of the defendant to protect
himself without judicial interference.
The paradigm, for Kuhn, is deeply rooted in the professional
community and resistance to its reformation is well organized.'
The legal community has long held sacred the right of vigorous
defense.' Vigorous defense is, after all, a fundamental legal right
and established defense attorneys can hardly be expected to com-
placently relinquish a right and strengthen their opponents'
arsenals.
The paradigm, the right of vigorous defense, ages ungracefully.
The weight of unresolved problems creates a crisis in the profes-
sional community when some defendants unnecessarily prolong lit-
igation, increase expenses and force plaintiffs into premature set-
tlement postures. 10
A paradigm shift11 occurs where competing theories seek reso-
6. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92 (2d ed. 1970).
7. Id. at 175.
8. Id. at 64.
In the development of any science, the first received paradigm is usually felt to
account quite successfully for most of the observations and experiments easily ac-
cessible to that science's practitioners. Further development, therefore, ordinarily
calls for the construction of elaborate equipment, the development of an esoteric
vocabulary and skills, and a refinement of concepts that increasingly lessens their
resemblance to their usual common-sense prototypes. That professionalization
leads, on the one hand, to an immense restriction of the scientist's vision and to a
considerable resistance to paradigm change. The science has become increasingly
rigid . . .. By ensuring that the paradigm will not be too easily surrendered, resis-
tance guarantees that scientists will not be lightly distracted and that the anoma-
lies that lead to paradigm change will penetrate existing knowledge to the core.
Id.
9. Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 127, 4 P. 1106, 1109-10 (1884).
10. See generally supra notes 2-5 and cases cited.
11. KUHN, supra note 6, at 116.
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lution of the problems. Various solutions have been offered in fed-
eral statutes, Supreme Court decisions, and state actions and then
patched together by courts and legislative bodies to confront the
"abuses of excess advocacy.""
Paradigm development culminates when reformists discover a
strong and stable solution. The vision of the professional commu-
nity shifts from the former paradigm toward a new paradigm that
more effectively solves "the problems that had led the old one to a
crisis."' 3 In the Hegelian sense, the community incorporates the
old paradigm into the new paradigm as an essential element. Some
aspects of the right to a vigorous defense can be problematic and
may be subsumed into the tort of malicious defense. Malicious de-
fense offers an efficient solution to defendants' procedural abuses
yet maintains their right to vigorously defend themselves.
III. THE OLD PARADIGM: THE RIGHT OF VIGOROUS DEFENSE
The legal community has long respected a defendant's right to
a vigorous defense free from judicial interference.' "The defen-
dant stands only on his legal rights,-the plaintiff having taken his
case to court, the defendant has the privilege of calling upon him
to prove it to the satisfaction of the judge or jury, and he is guilty
of no wrong in exercising this privilege.' 1 5 The legal community
justifies vigorous defense, because the plaintiff initiates the action
and the defendant responds instinctively: "self-defense is the first
law of nature."' 6 Vigorous defense advocates the freedom of the
individual to defend actions in good faith.' 7 It protects good faith
defendants with limited financial resources from being forced into
premature settlement postures by the threat of sanctions or judi-
cial reprisals.' 8 It encourages defendants with "colorable, albeit
12. Van Patten and Willard, supra note 5, at 936.
13. KUHN, supra note 6, at 153. "Probably the most prevalent claim advanced by the
proponents of a new paradigm is that they can solve the problems that have led the old one
to a crisis."
14. Eastin, 66 Cal. at 127, 4 P. at 1109-10.
15. Id.
16. Baxter v. Brown, 83 Kan. 302, 305, 111 P. 430, 431 (1910).
17. Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 638, 586 P.2d 942, 949, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461, 468
(1978). "This court has repeatedly stressed the importance of permitting counsel to be a
vigorous advocate ...."
18. Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 835-36, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (1976). "The
American Rule is based upon the philosophy that 'one should not be penalized for merely
defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from
instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their
opponent's counsel.'" (citing Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718
(1967)).
1986]
3
Ward: The Movement from Vigorous to Malicious Defense as an Example of the Evolution of Legal Principles
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1986
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
novel," legal defenses to test those defenses in court.19
The right of vigorous defense protects good faith and finan-
cially disadvantaged defendants as well as defendants with novel
defenses. But, taken to its logical extreme, vigorous defense allows
any feasible tactic, even one that is "willful, intentional, malicious
or fraudulent." 0 These abuses of the judicial system have created
a crisis in the legal community. Courts must draw a line between
unrestrained advocacy and the well reasoned pursuit of justice.
Vigorous defense must be balanced against the right to bring a
lawsuit with minimal delay and expense.
IV. A PATCHWORK OF SOLUTIONS FOR PROBLEMS IN THE OLD
PARADIGM
Attempts to resolve the problems of vigorous defense, though
lacking cohesion, enjoy limited success. A federal statute awards
expenses and attorney fees to parties injured by unreasonable and
vexatious multiplication of legal proceedings.21  Traditionally,
courts followed the American rule which embodied the principle
that attorney fees could only be awarded if they were mentioned in
the original agreement in contractual disputes or if they were per-
mitted by statute. The United States Supreme Court rejected this
American rule and allowed attorney fees as a punitive measure
where a party acted in "bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for op-
pressive reasons.""
The California Supreme Court, in Young v. Redman,2 3 ac-
knowledged the problem of "frivolous, 'bad faith,' matters" but re-
frained from judicially legislating a new tort. In Bauguess v.
Paine,24 the California court expressed its fear of unfettered judi-
cial discretion in the imposition of sanctions.25 The California Leg-
islature responded with a procedural mechanism which awards at-
torney fees and reasonable expenses to victims of frivolous and
unnecessarily dilatory "tactics or actions not based on good
19. Browning Debenture Holders Comm. v. Dasa Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir.
1977).
20. Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 555, 46 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1943).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1983). "Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases
in any court of the United States or any Territory there of [sic] who so multiplies the pro-
ceedings in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by
the court to satisfy personally such excess costs."
22. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1972) (quoting MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 54.77[2], at
1709 (2d ed. 1972)).
23. 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86.
24. 22 Cal. 3d 635, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461.
25. Id. at 638, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
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faith." 26
These statutory and judicial responses to the problems inher-
ent in the right of vigorous defense effectively control abuses in
limited areas but fail to achieve a complete solution. For example,
Rule 11 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure provides sanc-
tions to partially remedy abuses in pleading practice.2 It requires
reasonable investigation 28 and discourages shotgun pleadings.2 9
But, the rule only affects a narrow range of abuses. Rule 37 of the
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure remedies discovery abuses but is
limited by judicial discretion. 0 Summary judgment has been rec-
ommended as a test of the sufficiency of improper defensive plead-
ings31 but, like Rule 11 and Rule 37 sanctions, it requires a proper
plaintiff's motion and supporting brief, and statutes and judicial
discretion constrain the scope of the remedy.2
The United States Supreme Court, in National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,33 supported sanctions
for discovery abuses. But, the Court addressed only a narrow range
of abuses. Each case, according to the Court, must be carefully an-
alyzed to determine its appropriateness for the application of sanc-
tions. The California Supreme Court, in Bertero v. National Gen-
eral Corp.," recognized the tort of malicious prosecution in bad
faith cross pleadings but failed to establish a cause of action for
malicious defense. 35
Confronted with ever increasing abuse, federal and state judi-
cial and statutory solutions have been patched together. But judi-
26. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 128.5 (West 1985).
(a) Every trial court shall have the power to order a party or a party's attor-
ney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred
by another party as a result of tactics or actions not based on good faith which are
frivolous or which cause unnecessary delay. Frivolous actions or delaying tactics
include, but are not limited to, making or opposing motions without good faith.
(b) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on notice
contained in a party's moving or responding papers; or the court's own motion,
after notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing expenses shall be in
writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the
conduct.
27. MONT. R. Civ. P. 11.
28. See, e.g., Kinle v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 983
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
29. See, e.g., Miller v. Schweickhart, 413 F. Supp. 1059, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
30. MONT. R. Civ. P. 37(a) - (g).
31. Comment, Controlling the Malicious Defendant, 2 STAN. L. REV. 184, 192 (1949).
32. MONT. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
33. 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
34. 13 Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1975).
35. Id. at 52-53, 529 P.2d at 615, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (The court failed to recognize a
new tort of malicious defense in deference to the right of vigorous defense).
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cial and legislative change is gradual; it is slow to challenge funda-
mental legal principles like the right of vigorous defense. Vigorous
defense remains deeply entrenched in the current legal community.
Yet, the weight of the problems associated with vigorous defense
demands acceleration of the evolutionary process. It is time to rec-
ognize the tort of malicious defense.
V. REVOLUTION AND THE BIRTH OF THE NEW TORT OF MALICIOUS
DEFENSE
The tort of malicious defense presents a solution to problems
created by blind adherence to the right of vigorous defense. The
tort provides a remedy against defense tactics which employ "mal-
ice coupled with lack of probable cause."36 Malice allows a subjec-
tive measure of the intent of the defendant to delay or otherwise
interfere with the litigation process.37 Probable cause provides an
objective test of the merits of the defendant's defense. 38 A defense
brought in good faith with some basis in law and fact is a vigorous
defense, easily distinguished from a malicious defense.
39
Arguably, the creation of a new tort may lead to a prolifera-
tion of appeals4 ° or an even greater volume of complicated litiga-
tion.41 These possibilities must be weighed against the favorable
policy considerations of the deterrence of bad faith conduct by de-
fendants and the maintenance of the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess.42 Most American jurisdictions enjoy freedom from controlling
precedent which could delay adoption of the new tort."3 They wait
on the traditional reluctance of the legal community to modify es-
tablished legal principles.
Modification of established legal principles is a painful process
but recognition of malicious defense will solve many of the
problems that have plagued the legal community. The tort would
curb defense abuses by threatening punitive damages and large
jury awards. Potentially malicious defendants will be forced to
measure their malice against the immeasurable uncertainty of a
jury's deliberations rather than the relatively stable statutory sanc-
tions. Bad faith conduct will be deterred and the integrity of the
36. Van Patten and Willard, supra note 5, at 935.
37. Id. at 931.
38. Id. at 930.
39. Id.
40. Young, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
41. Van Patten and Willard, supra note 5, at 917.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 916.
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judicial process will be preserved.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tort of malicious defense offers an effective response to
"abuses of excess advocacy."4 ' Its eventual acceptance depends on
the erosion of the legal community's resistance to change. Such
erosion is natural, inevitable, unpredictable. The apologists for the
right of vigorous defense fear the discouragement of "forceful ad-
vocacy" 5 and a new weapon to cripple defense strategies. They ap-
peal for legislative solutions with proper procedural protections
rather than "unfettered and unbridled" judicial discretion.4 In
pursuit of fairness and procedural safeguards, however, the legisla-
ture might create a solution considerably more rigid and ineffective
than the situation demands. The interpretive filter of the courts,
flushed with a steady stream of significant cases, would allow for
gradual development and implementation of the tort of malicious
defense after the first revolutionary recognition.
The Montana Supreme Court recently recognized new torts in
the areas of insurance" and employment. 8 The court should ex-
pand the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to include the
litigation process. Attorneys and their clients should be held to the
same good faith standards as those required of insurers and
employers.
The tort of malicious defense deserves the acceptance of the
legal community. The tort counteracts abuses of the right to a vig-
orous defense. This strong, young legal principle should prevail
over the patchwork of problem-riddled remedies now available.
Consternation with defendants' delay and abuse of the legal sys-
tem should hasten the evolution of the tort of malicious defense.
44. Van Patten and Willard, supra note 5, at 936.
45. In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 653, 646 P.2d 179, 189, 183 Cal. Rptr.
508, 518 (1982).
46. Young, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 839, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 931.
47. Klaudt v. Flink, __ Mont -, 658 P.2d 1065 (1983) (The court recognized a
remedy in tort for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing where a defendant's
insurer failed to settle with a third party claimant).
48. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., - Mont. -, 668 P.2d 213 (1983) (The court
extended tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to wrongful dis-
charge of an employee by an employer).
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